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Existing studies of capital structure and performance cover 
vast amounts of diverse firms including profit-oriented business 
and financial institutions based on the capital structure theories to 
describe how firms decide to finance their operation; however, 
studies related to the topic of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is 
fairly constrained as it only takes account of a specific region or 
country and previous research does not include the unique 
characteristics of MFI. As the purpose of MFIs is to contribute to 
poverty alleviation in developing and transition countries, their 
primary concerns are self-sustainability and outreach which are 
different from the conventional financial institutions, and they 
have started to engage in commercialization; this research would 
be conducted with some objectives. To begin with, it intends to 
give a short, understandable overview of MFIs to the readers; 
especially, potential investors. Then, it aims to investigate the 
casual relationship between the capital structure denoted by 
lagged debt to equity variable (lagDTE) and the performance of 
 
 
507 MFIs from 44 countries for the period 2003-2015. Apart from 
other financial institutions, MFI performance is measured by either 
financial performance or outreach performance so this study 
would be employing return on equity (ROE) and operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) measures as the proxies for financial 
performance measurement; while, the logarithm of number of 
active borrowers normalized by number of population (LNABP) 
and the logarithm of average loan per borrower divided by gross 
national income per capita (LALBGNI) would be used as a 
representative for the outreach performance measurement. 
Besides the main independent variable - lagDTE, there are other 
lagged controlling variables included such as gross loan portfolio 
to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) 
past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage of female 
borrowers (lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and 
three dummy variables: profit MFIs (Profit), regulated MFIs 
(Regulate), and deposit-taking MFIs (DT). With the use of the 
random effects and fixed effects panel data model, the empirical 
outcomes have been found to confirm the trade-off theory in 
corporate finance: that the financial leverage significantly and 
positively affects the profitability (ROE) and that the breadth of 
outreach of MFIs (LNABP) generated by the benefits of debt 
financing like tax shields, are consistent with the findings in 
previous literature. Furthermore, financial leverage could impose 
a financial distress on the management to perform better in order 
 
 
to fulfill the payment obligations. In contrast, the operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) and the depth of outreach (LALBGNI) are 
insignificantly  affected by  lagDTE.  . The insignificant inverse 
relationship between the financial leverage and operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) could come from a number of MFIs which do not 
generate enough revenues to compensate for their operational 
costs. With further investigation, the findings of the effect of 
financial leverage on the performance of MFIs with different legal 
status are mainly insignificant. The main reason behind this is that 
MFIs have identical organizational models and objectives since the 
majority of shareholders are public funders. Correspondingly, 
MFIs could access the stable cost of available funding instruments 
from both private and public funders via microfinance investment 
vehicles (MIVs). For the final recommendations, all the related 
disciplines should therefore, weigh the advantages of debt against 
the costs before designing the sophisticated strategies, laws, and 
regulations to make financial inclusion because large amounts of 
debt are not always able to bring out the maximum benefits when 
it reaches a certain point based on the theory. Moreover, 
alternative sources of funding like deposits and innovative 
technology should be expanded as they assist in cost reduction 
and sustainable growth.      
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In corporate finance, capital structure is a vital topic of debate. 
Capital structure is defined as the financing decision that firms 
make to finance their operations and growth through debt or equity, 
or other outstanding securities (Berk J., DeMarzo P. & Harford J., 
2012). Trade-off theory and pecking order theory are the 
competing models that explain how firms make decisions on 
financing in order to create the best mix of their capital structures. 
According to the pecking order theory, organizations would 
choose to use the internal funds before the external ones; whereas, 
trade-off theory states that firm would consider both benefits and 
costs of debt to reach their optimal level of leverage because of 
the asymmetric information problem. There are many empirical 
studies on the impact of financial structure on the performance of 
various firms including on big corporations, SMEs, and financial 
institutions that are based on these two theories. One study 
conducted by Foam and French (2002) has confirmed the pecking 
order theory: firms with larger profit have less leverage as 
managers prefer internal sources to the external ones. Conversely, 
topics that are related to this issue in microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) seem to be rather limited since existing studies have 
mostly focused on one specific country or economy (Ngoc N. B., 
2016) and a number of literature reviews do not include the 
specific characteristics of MFIs. MFIs have played a necessary 





been providing financial services to the excluded groups left 
behind by the formal lending institutions in order to assist them in 
getting out of the grinding poverty; in particular, female borrowers 
since the late 1970s. Additionally, MFIs are different from other 
formal financial organizations as they have to reach both social 
mission and self-sustainability, which is called as the double 
bottom line (Hartarska V. & Nadolnyak D., 2007). By 2014, there 
were around 4,000 MFIs serving more than 200 million clients in 
developing countries (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). Still, many 
poor borrowers have not yet received access to financial services. 
By 2013, there were 10.7 percent of the world population or 767 
million people living below the poverty line a day – $1.90 (CGAP 
& Symbiotics' MIVs Surveys, 2016). Moreover, around 2 billion 
young people do not have a savings account and many micro-
enterprises cannot access needed financial instruments (The 
World Bank, 2016). The challenge occurs because of the high 
transaction cost and the limitation in capital. Accordingly, there is 
many a huge development within MFI industry related to 
commercialization. The traditional MFIs like non-profit NGOs 
have also transformed themselves into profit commercial 
enterprises to find alternative funding sources (Armendariz B., & 
Morduch J., 2010).  
Based on the unique characteristics of MFIs and their 
evolution, studying the impact of financial structure on the 
performance of MFIs would provide several implications based on 





large unbalanced panel data and includes other specific 
characteristics of MFIs to shed light on the capital structure and 
the performance of MFIs which could fulfill the gap from the 
previous studies. This study also aims to provide a comprehensive 
background of MFIs to the outsiders; especially, to the potential 
investors. The last objective is to give any possible explanation 
between capital structure and the performance of MFIs. 
As such, this research would answer three main questions: 
what is the impact of capital structure in terms of leverage on the 
performance of MFIs? How capital structure differently affects the 
performance of MFIs with different legal status? And what are the 
possible explanations of the outcomes? 
This study is organized in six sections. Section II is literature 
review classified into three subsections: the brief and 
understandable explanation of institutional background, capital 
structure theories, and the evidence studies of the capital 
structure and firm performance including MFIs. Section III is 
empirical study divided into two subsections which consist of data 
and variables. Section IV presents the empirical models and 
methodology. Section V shows the empirical outcomes and 
discussion of the results in detail. Section VI provides some 
recommendations and limitations of this study and Section VII 







II. Literature Review 
 
One objective of this study intends to provide a short, 
comprehensive description of MFI background. As a result, this 
part would presently explain an overview of microfinance before 
proceeding to the theories of capital structure and the empirical 
evidences.  
a. Microfinance Background  
 
Microfinance could be defined as the financial service sources for 
the poor household who lacks to access to or does not have full 
access to the formal financial sector. Borrowers are able to get 
loans to establish or improve their business and to save money for 
the future needs through microfinance (Responsability, 2016). 
According to another definition, microfinance could also be 
described as the diversity of available financial services provided 
to the lower-income clients and underserved groups who have no 
or limited collateral and could not satisfy the required bank 
standard to take out loans. The purpose of microfinance is to fight 
against the poverty (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010), 
empower women, and contribute to the sustainable economic 
development.  
Why Microfinance Exists? 
According to the economic theory, capital naturally flows from the 





capital to the people who is lack of it. Surprisingly, it is different 
from the traditional perspective as the big firms get loans more 
easily as compared to poorer borrowers even if they are able to 
provide high interest rates based on the diminishing return 
principle. The two problems: adverse selection and moral hazard 
encountering by the lenders may provide enough explanation why 
it is hard to lend to the poor. Related to the adverse selection 
problem, the lenders do not have complete information about the 
poor borrowers so that they are unable to distinguish between the 
safer and riskier clients. If so, they would need to charge the same 
interest rate from all the customers which would then cause the 
safer borrowers to leave the market. To overcome it, lenders need 
to gather the information of the clients, but it is costly and it incurs 
high transaction costs to provide small-sized loans comparing to 
the big ones. The moral hazard appears when the lenders are not 
sure whether or not the borrowers would make a full effort to 
succeed in their investment. Therefore, the lenders require 
sufficient marketable assets to safeguard their risk of default 
coming from the clients. However, the poor does not have the 
required marketable collateral which makes it impossible for them 
to get loans (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010).  
Although they are unable to access the formal markets, they 
have another option to borrow from the informal credit market 
such as from money lenders, friends, or neighbors. Those players 
know more about poor borrowers than banks do; however, as they 





and charge ultra-high interest rates comparing to the formal 
financial institutions because they provide more flexible payment 
methods (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010) & (Fanconi P. & 
Scheurle P., 2017) and are more accessible. As an example, the 
informal operators charge twice or triple higher interest rates than 
formal institutions in Cambodia (Kimsay H., 2015). 
The presence of modern microfinance is the solution for both 
formal and informal lenders and it brings new hope to the poor. 
Microfinance does not only innovate the way to deal with risk 
through group lending but also brings more capital supply from 
both local and international investors to the poor borrowers 
(Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010). 
Microfinance Development 
The idea of micro financing is not new; it has been raised as a 
lending program focusing on the agricultural area since the early 
1900s. If one thinks of the modern microfinance infrastructure in 
developing countries, its starting point was from Bangladesh, by 
Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus in the middle of 1970s. 
He started to provide small-scale loans to the poor with no 
belongings, for them to establish small businesses that could give 
them the cash flow of income and tackle the sudden external 
shocks. In the mid-1980s, the Grameen Bank was established 
after he had found that the poor borrowers regularly paid their 
loans back although they had no collateral. Over the 1980s, 





to improve its lending methodologies to benefit the poor and 
various types of MFIs have started to develop. From the 1990s 
onwards, MFIs have started to find additional ways of raising 
capital; for instance, many MFIs have entered into the capital 
market so that they could access more funding sources for the 
needs of the borrowers. Furthermore, they have taken the 
advantage of technology to cut down the transaction costs and to 
extend their products and services such as different kinds of loans, 
deposits, insurances and so forth (Sundaresan S., 2008) & 
(Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). In developing countries, there 
are around 4,000 MFIs serving more than 200 million clients in 
2014 (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). The countries where the 
global biggest microfinance markets are Cambodia, India, Kenya, 
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Ghana, Mongolia, Paraguay, Tajikistan, Costa 
Rica, Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, and Ecuador 
(Responsibility , 2016) (see Firgure 1).  
Products and Services  
In the last decade, MFIs merely provided loans to the underserved 
segmentation. However, nowadays the demands of product and 
service diversification are increasing. There are two main types 
of product and service of MFIs: financial services and non-
financial services (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017).  
Financial services consist of credit, saving, insurance, and 
transaction services (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017) & 





ability to take out loans of different sizes and terms in exchange 
for repayment contract at an agreeable requirement time with 
collateral substitutes ①  and alternative forms of collateral ② 
(Ledgerwood, 2013). The credit product is provided in terms of 
individual loans and group loans. Individual loans are often 
provided to the individual borrowers with a small amount of 
collateral or guarantee to secure their risk; whereas, group loans 
are issued to the individual borrowers with a group. Each member 
agrees to joint liability or guarantee with other members. If one 
member does not repay the loan in a timely manner; there would 
be no further loans to others. Therefore, many MFIs do not 
demand collateral as each member would monitor other members 
by themselves. Each loan in terms of loan type, payment term, 
payment procedure, and loan interest is designed based on the 
customer need, income level, sector, and geographical area 
(Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017) & (Earne J. & Sherk L., 2013). 
Moreover, loans are offered for different purposes such as cash 
flow management, risk management, asset building and productive 
investment (Ledgerwood, 2013).  
Micro savings are regarded as the funding sources of MFIs 
which are collected from both individual – loan clients and non-
loan clients –and institutions. Micro savings contain two main 
savings: compulsory or mandatory savings and voluntary savings. 
                                            
①  Collateral substitutes: group guarantees, character-based lending, and 
frequent client visits (Ledgerwood, 2013). 






Compulsory or mandatory savings are the requiring conditional 
savings that the borrowers need to save as a fixed amount of loan 
if they want to receive a loan from MFIs and they act as the 
alternative forms of collateral. Voluntary savings refer to the 
savings by the public regardless of the loan clients. There are 
different kinds of voluntary savings with different features 
including interest rate and withdrawal ability that clients could 
choose based on different purposes. Different amounts of savings 
could help the poor to fulfill future expenses and deal with 
unexpected events (Ledgerwood J., 2013) & (Fanconi P. & 
Scheurle P., 2017). Micro savings would precisely describe in the 
funding sources section.  
Micro insurance provides the borrower with protection 
against unexpected, potential shocks because the poor tend to 
encounter daily hazards such as illness, natural disasters, 
agricultural losses, and other dangers more often than others. The 
insurance products provided include life insurance, real estate 
insurance, health insurance, credit risk insurance, and some types 
of pensions designed according to the demands of clients. Some 
MFIs require insurance as the compulsory condition for granting 
loans (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). In combination with other 
products and services, MFIs also provide transactional services 
such as local money transfer, remittance, mobile banking, and 
other kinds of payment as the demand for those is increasing 
(Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). The fee is charged differently 





Besides offering financial service, MFIs provide non-financial 
services. These services have both social intermediation and 
business development aim to profoundly improve needed skills of 
the target borrowers such as health education, literacy training, 
capacity building, agricultural knowledge, business networks, 
business training, and other kinds of services (Fanconi P. & 
Scheurle P., 2017) (see Figure 2).  
Lending Methodologies  
There are several lending methodologies of MFIs such as group 
lending, mutual monitoring, progressive lending, and regular 
meeting. Group lending is regarded as an effective way for modern 
MFIs to deal with asymmetric information as each member would 
agree to have joint liability, share knowledge, and to act as a 
monitor of payment for the other members. Thus, it reduces the 
loan default rate coming from through the use of peer pressure 
and social status. Mutual monitoring is the lending methodology 
through which borrowers share their own knowledge and 
experiences amongst other borrowers regardless of they are joint 
liability or non-joint liability; as a result, it could improve learning 
effect on other clients and would prevent potential repayment 
issues in the later stage. Progressive lending is another method 
that permits clients to get better loan conditions such as better 
interest rates and larger amounts of loans for the next 
disbursement if they make timely payments without any problem. 





Loan officers could share necessary information of the 
organizational development, new products and services, and any 
updated policy or regulation with clients. They could also follow 
up on loan usage, get information on the difficulties and demands 
of the clients; in particular, they could identify potential issues so 
that they could prevent those problems from happening in advance 
(Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). 
Types and Regulations 
MFIs have different legal forms ranging from non-regulated 
institutions to regulated institutions with different characteristics. 
The following types of MFIs are institutions which are subject to 
international funding. NGOs could be divided into two kinds of 
institutions – NGOs which provide only loans and NGOs which 
supply financial services along with other kinds of non-financial 
services: economic and social services. NGOs are mostly funded 
by subsidies and donations and are under national laws: civilian 
and commercial law. NGOs are usually not subject to bank 
supervisory and non-regulated so that they are not deposit-taking 
institutions. Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) are the kind 
of institutions that are transferred from former NGOs. NBFIs - 
including insurance companies, leasing companies, specialist 
credit companies, and others - provide limited financial services 
and non-financial services, but they mostly focus on group loans 
with no collateral. They are under certain state agency 





specific license is provided. Rural Banks or Rural and Community 
Banks are the type of MFIs that operate and target borrowers who 
work and live in the rural areas or borrowers who are involved in 
the agricultural field. Rural banks could be owned by government, 
member, and individual and normally function under the 
supervisory of a bank with license. A Credit Union or cooperative 
is defined as the member-based financial institution – known as 
financial cooperatives, cooperatives (SACCOs), savings and 
credits, credit unions, savings and loan associations, and building 
societies (Ledgerwood, 2013). Financial cooperatives could be 
formed based on the members who share a common religion, 
geographical location, or employment with varying sizes. The 
products and services are provided for the sake of member 
benefits with no outsiders and each member has a restriction on 
the number of holding shares. The generating revenue is paid as 
capital stock, dividend, interest rate reduction, and others. In 
addition, they are subjective to the laws of specific country. 
Specialized MFI banks are regulated institutions with strict legal 
framework and are monitored by the national central bank or other 
government institutions. MFI banks are subsidiary of other larger 
banks and independent institutions. Furthermore, they serve a 
larger range of clients from the lowest to the highest income-class 
of clients including the borrowers are not being reached by the 
formal institutions like bank (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017), 
(MIX, 2017) & (Ledgerwood J. , 2013).   





MFIs: MFIs who do not mobilize deposits – called non-deposit-
taking MFIs – and MFIs who are authorized to receive deposits – 
deposit-taking MFIs. As such, the deposit-taking MFIs are under 
to the strict laws and regulations from national bank of each 
country because they encounter higher risk which could cause a 
crisis within the whole financial system. The differences of 
regulation framework③ between the non-deposit-taking MFIs and 
deposit-taking MFIs are capital adequacy ratio, minimum capital 
requirement, and liquidity ratio (see Table 1).  
Challenges 
There are some emerging challenges of MFIs such as cost to 
access credit, regulation, and multi-loans. The first challenge is 
that loan pricing in developing countries is higher than in the 
developed ones because the financial revenues of MFIs mainly 
come from small-sized loans with high transaction cost (see 
Figure 3). Operating costs consume more than half of the total 
amount of lending interest rate. Comparatively, operating costs 
could be varied depending on the different geographies in terms 
of higher financial system development and larger loan. The 
interest rates of loans are calculated based on their capital costs, 
operating costs, profits, contingency reserves, and tax 
                                            
③ Regulation framework could be categorized into prudential and non-prudential 
regulation. Prudential regulation: the laws and regulations from banking and 
insurance supervision, and authorized, special supervisory bodies, is designed to 
protect depositors and country overall financial system. Non-prudential 
regulation contains the laws and regulations from consumer protecting agency, 





expenditures (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017). The high loan price 
causes difficulties to both MFIs (limited transactions, product, and 
service innovation) and the clients; especially, the poorest (high 
interest rate of loans) (Sundaresan S., 2008). Additionally, it drives 
the mission drift④ as lending of small loans to the poorer clients 
incurs high costs, reduces profitability, and lowers the chances of 
being sustainable so that MFIs would serve larger loans (Cull R., 
Demirguc-Kunt A. & Morduch J., 2007).  
Another challenge is regulation framework. Only formal MFIs 
are regulated financial institutions while others - informal and 
semi-formal institutions - are not regulated which are 
disadvantages to the relevant parties such as borrowers, 
depositors, funders, and others, because only regulated MFIs are 
strictly monitored by regulators. Equally important, non-regulated 
MFIs have a limited ability to raise capital from potential investors; 
especially since MFIs are not allowed to mobilize savings. The 
cause could be explained by the incurring of transaction costs to 
comply with all the laws and regulations like the level of minimum 
capital balance at the central bank (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 
2017).  
Borrowing loans from multiple MFIs at the same time is 
another current problem. Clients take out loans from more than 
two or three institutions at once which makes them unable to pay 
                                            
④ Mission drift: the diverse of traditional social mission of MFIs changing from 
targeting the neglected clients underserved by conventional financial institutions 






them back. This causes emerging problems for all involved 
institutions and causes over-indebtedness. The root causes of 
multiple lending include underused credit report, lack of a well 
credit assessment of potential clients, and the issuance of many 
land titles by legal authorities (which could be used as collateral 
documents many times) (Riecke, 2014). 
Funding Sources 
Funding plays a vital role in MFI industry to finance their 
transaction, to create new products and services, to support the 
growth of portfolio, and to penetrate new markets. MFIs have 
started to move from mainly depending on subsidies and donations 
to accessing other sources of funding like commercial banks in 
order to achieve their goals and support their potential future 
growths (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010).  
MFIs obtain funding sources ranging from individuals to 
institutions, from government to domestic commercial banks, and 
from small local NGOs to big international organizations in the 
form of donor grants, subsidies, and debt. There are also equity 
investors who consider investing in MFIs (Fehr D. & Hishigsuren 
G. , 2006).  
If one takes a closer look at the balance sheet – total assets, 
total liabilities, and total capital - of MFIs, it would not be that 
different from the other profit-oriented business (see Table 2). As 
a consequence, there are two keys of capital sources for MFIs: 





as debt capital and equity capital. Choosing between debt and 
equity is arguable. However, cost and benefit strategy is usually 
used to define the optimal point across industry. To enumerate, 
external debt of MFIs has a significant relationship with tangible 
assets, profit distribution status, and size. Donations have 
significant relationship with past due loans and tangible assets 
meaning that donors consider about risk when they make the 
decision to give (Tchuigoua H., 2015). 
The primary funding source of many MFIs has come from 
grants and highly subsidized loans – called ‘soft loans’ from either 
public funders or private funders such as multilateral agencies, aid 
agencies of government, foundations, NGOs, and other 
organizations with strict conditions and requirements of each 
agency (Fehr D. & Hishigsuren G., 2006). When MFIs have 
constant sales, strong collateral, and lucrative growth, debt 
financing would be taken into consideration in the case of lacking 
equity financing. In general, debt capital is preferred to equity 
capital because it has a lower cost of capital (Berk J.& DeMarzo 
P., 2007). There are advantages and drawbacks of debt financing.  
The main benefits of debt are that the interest rate is tax 
deductible, therefore increasing the amount of income; control is 
maintained meaning that lender have no undue power on the firm, 
and there is profit retention as it puts the pressure to company to 
generate income in order to meet its interest payment obligation. 
The key costs of debt include the danger of property loss as the 





when they default, the risk of bankruptcy causes by financial 
distress, and future cash flow and growth limitation (Berk J.& 
DeMarzo P., 2007) & (Way J., 2015). There are several types of 
debt financing in MFIs: voluntary deposits, compulsory or 
mandatory deposits, borrowing, and other liabilities.  
Deposit products are one of the main funding sources of 
financial institution for lending operation (Fehr D. & Hishigsuren 
G. , 2006). Deposits are categories into voluntary deposits and 
compulsory or mandatory deposits. Both deposits have come from 
either individual (loan clients and non-loan clients) or other 
institutions (MIX Market, 2017).  
Compulsory or mandatory deposits are amounts of money of 
credit that are required from MFIs as the collateral of lending 
loans. MFIs determine the amount of money to be saved, the term 
of deposits, and the time the borrowers have to deposit and could 
withdraw based on organizational deposit policy and procedure. 
Besides being as collateral, it also provides the funding source for 
the operation of MFIs. In contrast, it is an insufficient source for 
the lending activities of MFIs because it limits the number of 
clients served by MFIs. Thus, MFIs need to move to voluntary 
deposits for their long run operation (Wisniwski S., 1999).  
Voluntary deposits are open to both non-loan clients and loan 
clients. There are many diverse saving products with different 
terms, interest rates, and withdrawal abilities such as current 
accounts, passbook saving accounts, contractual saving accounts, 






Current accounts – called checking accounts or demand 
accounts– are deposits that clients could make their daily 
transactions anytime without prior notification. MFIs usually 
require clients to deposit some amounts of money as a minimum 
balance with no interest payment to depositors as it has high cost 
and risk. The fee of current accounts is charged monthly, 
transaction basic or both of them based on MFI policies and 
procedures. Besides providing funding for lending operations, it is 
also a tool for attracting clients to MFIs. Passbook saving accounts 
are deposits that clients could fully make daily transaction or in 
some restrictions and these transactions would be recorded in the 
passbooks. It is easily accessible and clients could receive some 
amounts of interest rate. Moreover, it provides the stable funds to 
MFIs and attracts micro-clients. Contractual saving accounts 
including commitment savings or target savings are the deposits 
that clients need to regularly deposit some amounts of money 
within particular time for specific purpose (Ledgerwood J., 2013). 
Time deposits - fixed deposits, term deposits, certificates of 
deposits – are deposits that do not allow daily transactions to be 
made. Clients are not able to withdraw them until they reach a 
specific term such as 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, or 12 months 
with different interest rates depending on the term of time 
deposits. Time deposits provide huge amount of funds to MFIs 
with a longer term of funding sources and low administrative costs 





Both voluntary deposits and compulsory or mandatory 
deposits provide large amounts of low-cost funding sources to 
MFIs to be self-sustainable without heavily relying on donations 
or subsidies which are not stable and restricted to the operation 
of MFIs. By 2014, deposits are account for 50% of funding sources 
of MFIs (Perron, 2016). Additionally, many deposit-taking MFIs 
which enable diversity of voluntary saving products to fulfill client 
needs could serve small depositors and reach both breadth and 
depth of outreach (Gonzalez A. & Meyer R., 2009) & (Wisniwski 
S., 1999).  
Borrowings and other liabilities are defined as the credits or 
amounts of money which MFIs borrow from  either local or 
international financial institutions, from public funders or private 
funders in terms of short term or long term debt at the market 
interest rate like commercial loans or lower than market interest 
rate including grants or soft loans (concessional borrowing) based 
on the objectives (social, return, or both focus), mandates, and 
conditions of investors (Perron, 2016) through fund 
administrators ⑤  – microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs). 
Credit funding from commercial banks at market interest rate is 
expensive comparing to grants, donors, or subsidies for small size 
                                            
⑤  Fund administrators are financial intermediaries between public 
investors/private investors and MFIs. They are professional institutions that 
select, invest, advice, and follow up MFIs. The top ten managers of MIVs are: 
BlueOrchard Finance, Cyrano, Developing World Markets, Finance in Motion, 
Incofin, Oikocredit, ResponsAbility, Symbiotics, Triodos, and Triple Jump – which 






MFIs or new established MFIs, but it provides the huge amounts 
of funding sources for MFIs which are restricted to mobilize 
deposits or have capital limitation (SapundzhievaRalitsa, 2011), 
(Wisniwski S., 1999), (BoganVicki, November 2012) & (Fanconi P. 
& Scheurle P., 2017). 
Besides raising capital through debt, MFIs could be financed 
from equity. Equity financing is an act of raising funds from either 
the owners of institution, public funders, or private funders to 
reach the demand of liquidity within MFIs. MFIs could issue stocks 
in terms of common stock or preferred stock without borrowing 
from creditors (Perron, 2016). Shareholder equity is calculated by 
total assets minus total liabilities meaning that owner equity is the 
residual interest after all assets are sold and all liabilities are paid 
(Delloite,2010)&(Clark K., 2015). Therefore, negative shareholder 
equity could occur once the total liabilities are greater than total 
assets. There are different advantages of equity financing. Equity 
funds provide substantial funding sources to MFIs. There is no 
financial distress of interest rate repayment although institutions 
get loss as it is a form of ownership that the investors share their 
risk together. Firm could use equity to generate cash flow for 
expanding growth and to pay all cost. For a young organization 
with no credit record, equity financing is important to cover the 
start-up costs (Wisniwski S., 1999). In contrast, equity financing 
also has drawbacks. The control of firm or ownership would be 
shared amongst the other investors and the profits given to 





for borrowing (Berk J.& DeMarzo P., 2007). Similarly, if the 
majority of owners mainly consider the financial return in the form 
of dividend, MFIs would bear high cost of capital requiring by risk 
premium and could not get benefit from tax-deduction (Wisniwski 
S., 1999). 
To sum up, MFIs could rise funding from three main sources: 
debt, equity, and deposits (if the MFIs have authority to collect 
deposits) from both private and public funders⑥  at local and 
international location through MIVs. The MFI funding sources 
obtained throughout the MIVs are classified by type of funders and 
funding tools (see Table 3). The main player of funding MFIs is 
from public funders and the main source of funding is a deposit 
which is cost less as compared to the rest, following by debt 
capital and equity capital. Furthermore, the local financing 
dominates the international financing caused from the cost of 
raising capital (Fanconi P. & Scheurle P., 2017) (see Firgure4). 
Consequently, each type of MFIs has own specific ownership 
and funding instruments (see Table 4). Each source of funding has 
both pros and cons; therefore, MFIs have to consider what the 
optimal capital structure is in order to reach their double bottom 
line: social mission and self-sustainability mission. The decision 
of financing firm could be explained by the theories of capital 
structure in corporate finance. 
                                            
⑥ There are two types of funders: public funders and private funders. Public 
funders aim to reach development goals, social goals, and private factor 
involvement. Private funders intend to meet both profit and social objectives 





b. Theories of Capital Structure 
 
Capital structure is a composite of debt capital and equity capital. 
Related to this issue, there are two most competing theories such 
as trade-off theory and pecking order theory which attempt to 
describe the financing behaviors and the effect of capital structure 
on the performance of firms in corporate finance (Fama F. E. & 
French R. K, 2002) & (Swinnen S., Voordeckers W. & Vandemaele 
S., 2005).  
Both theories have developed from the traditional capital 
structure theory of Modigliani and Miller (MM). In perfect market, 
it is stated that the capital structure has no relevant to the value 
of the firm regardless of the usage of debt or equity meaning that 
there is no optimal leverage ratio based on the assumptions of MM 
irrelevant propositions. MM theory assumes that there are no tax 
benefits, no costs of transaction, no costs of bankruptcy, equal 
information access of investors, and same interest rate of each 
funding source. MM theory with taxes is stated that the more of 
debt, the more value of firm because the firm could be beneficial 
from the tax deduction (Modigliani F. & Miller M. H., 1958) & 
(Modigliani F. & Miller M. H., 1963). In the reality, the market is 
imperfect; there are costs of bankruptcy, costs of agency, and tax 
shields so that the capital structure is relevant to the value of firms 
as well as their performance.  
Trade-off theory is the theory that firms identify their best 





weighting either costs or benefits of one more dollar of debt within 
imperfect market. The costs of debts consist of costs of 
bankruptcy, costs of agency, and other costs. Whereas, the 
advantages of debts could be free cash flow creation, interest rate 
gained by tax deductibility, and other pros that have already 
mentioned. The consideration between costs and benefits of debts 
is varied across profitable firms and growth firms (Fama F. E. & 
French R. K, 2002). To illustrate, firms with profitability would 
choose debt rather than equity since the firms could get benefit 
from tax deductibility (Myers S. C., 1984). For firms with more 
investment opportunities would have lower leverage because they 
do not have free cash flow problems (Fama F. E. & French R. K, 
2002).  
In contrast, pecking order theory developed by Myers in 1984 
states that firms choose retained earnings (internal sources), then 
external sources – debt (from the safe one to the risky one) 
before equity because of the costs of financing. The financing 
costs include costs of issuing new securities and asymmetric 
information costs because insiders have better information than 
outsiders leading to the mispricing of the market value of the firm 
(Myers S. C., 1984). Therefore, the difference level of leverage of 
the firm is not from the consideration between cost and benefit of 
the debt, but by the net cash flows of the firm. The theory predicts 
the profitable firms have lower leverage because debt increase 
does not assist their operation while the amount of profit is greater 





opportunities have higher leverage because firms could get higher 
amount debt with lower-cost. Conversely, the firms with higher 
expected investment have lower current leverage as firms 
consider both future and current costs of financing (Fama F. E. & 
French R. K, 2002) & (Black K. H., 2002).  
Within the perfect market, firms could take advantage of using 
debt comparing to equity. However, the high level of leverage up 
to a specific point would cause the firm financial distress and end 
up with bankruptcy because firms have to fulfill interest rate 
payment obligation. As a result, when firm increased the level of 
debt, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) would decrease 
at the first period, after that it would be increased. The optimal 
capital structure could be different by industry (industry with more 
fixed assets and industry with more intangible assets) and life 
cycle of business (newly firms tend to use equity rather than debt 
to cover their initial costs) (Ross S., 2015). 
c. Studies of Capital Structure and Performance  
 
There are empirical evidences from the existing studies related to 
the capital structure and the performance of firms, financial 
institutions, and MFIs.  
Related to the findings of the capital structure and the 
performance of firm supporting the pecking order theory, one 
study done by Fama and Frenh (2002), which tested the 





firms using more than thirty years’ worth of data with statistical 
model improvement, finds that the larger profitable firms has 
lower amount of leverage because manager prefers internal 
financing to external capital complying with pecking order theory. 
Hossain and Nguyen (2016) studying Canadian oil and gas 
companies finds the same results between strong negative 
correlation between financial leverage and the performance of 
companies before, during, and after the financial crisis. Tong and 
Green (2005) paper shows both trade-off and pecking order 
theory using listed companies in China to describe how firms make 
decisions related to the funding their operations based on three 
models developed from the previous papers by Baskin (1985, 1989) 
studied USA, Allen (1993) focused on Australia, and Adedeji (1998) 
studied Britain. The research notes that there is a significant 
negative correlation between leverage and profitability of the 
firms because firms tend to choose the lower-cost sources – 
retained earing - among available financing choices. Another 
important explanation is the information asymmetry which causes 
the limitations on the capital financing (Baskin J., 2007).   
For the empirical evidences supporting the trade-off theory, 
Leary and Roberts (2005) using regulated and financial firms 
covering from 1984 to 2001 data describes the larger profitable 
firms are more likely to choose debt over equity because they 
have less default risk so that they could borrower at the lower 
interest rate. The results are similar to Hovakimian, Hovakimian, 





dual credit. Helwege and Liang (1996) emphasizes the IPO firms 
using data of security offerings of the IPO firms from 1984 to 1992 
presents that it is unrelated to the deficit in internal sources when 
firms consider to raise external funds. Moreover, the finding is 
opposite to pecking order theory when the firms decide to choose 
different kinds of security offering in capital markets.  
Related to the capital structure and the performance of 
financial institutions, Taani (2013) demonstrates the effect of 
capital structure on the performance of bank in Jordan from 2007 
to 2011. The results of this research using multiple regressions 
are mixed such as there is a negative significant relationship 
between majorities banking performance: net profit, return on 
capital, net interest margin, debt to equity, and debt to total funds 
except for return of equity. The research illustrates that Jordanian 
banks rely on long-term debt rather than equity financing and the 
reason behind the negative relationship is the higher cost of debt 
with some recommendations. The findings were consistent with 
the pecking order theory. In contrast, Hutchison and Cox (2006) 
studies the causality between profitability and bank capital of US 
taking both period of less regulation and high regulation. The 
study finds the positive relationship between financial leverage 
and the profitability of US banks measured by the return on equity 
(ROE) and the return on asset (ROA). The results tend to support 
the trade-off theory: firms with profitability would choose debt 
rather than equity related to the costs of available financing 





researching on the authorized deposit-taking institutions in 
Australia, notes the increase in the level of leverage could lead to 
the increase in profit efficiency of the institutions and the 
performance as a consequence. The reasons are the higher level 
of debt causes institutions more financial distress and this 
pressure makes management to perform better.  
The studies are relevant to the financial leverage and the 
performance of MFIs done by Kyereboah-Coleman (2007). The 
research investigates the impact of financial structure on the 
performance of MFIs in Ghana using 10 years of panel data. It 
employs the outreach and default rate as the performance 
indicators. The empirical results emphasize the positive 
relationship between leverage and performance meaning that 
higher amounts of debt assisted MFIs could reach out to more 
clients (outreach) which in turn, would let the MFIs increase 
income and profitability through economics of scale in operating 
cost reduction and product diversification. Thus, MFIs with higher 
level of leverage perform better. Equally, Abar and Javaid (2016) 
describe the relationship between capital structure and the 
profitability of MFIs using data from 2004 to 2010. The outcomes 
of the positive significant correlation between debt to equity (DTE) 
and the performance of MFIs of both studies are similar to the 
other papers done by Sekabira (2013) investigates the role of 
capital structure on the performance of MFIs in Uganda and by 
Omare (2017) tests the impact of financial structure on the 





evidence, it could be concluded that highly leveraged MFIs 
perform better because of earning effect and the well- financial 
management of MFIs. 
Contrastingly, Ngo (2016) aims to test the effect of capital 
structure and legal status on the financial sustainability of MFIs in 
17 developing countries using data from 2010 to 2014. The result 
presents the financial structure measured by debt to equity (DTE) 
has a significantly negative impact on the operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) because of the associated cost of debts and the 
neglect of financing cost assessment (CGAP, 2007). Moreover, the 
research shows that there was no big difference in financial 
sustainability among different legal status of MFIs because theses 
MFIs have similar goals and business practice for serving the 
clients (Hartarska V., 2005) & (Mersland R. & Strom R. O., 2008) 
and most of funding are come from the public funders (Kohn D., 
2013).  
The finding related to legal status of Ngo (2016) is opposite 
to Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) researched on the performance 
comparison of MFIs regarding to their legal status covering the 
period from 2001 to 2006. The finding is that there is significant 
difference among the different types of MFIs because various 
ownerships might shape different organizational structures 
leading to the different results. Importantly, private MFIs have 
better performance in operational self-sufficiency (OSS) than 
non-government organizations (NGOs) and profit MFIs have 





conducted by Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) tests the 
relationship between the financial sector development including 
different types of MFIs and the performance of MFIs. The findings 
prove that MFIs could serve more borrowers and earn more profit 
in less-developed financial system because MFIs could fulfill the 
gap that commercial banks could not do based on the hypothesis 
of market failure.  
III. Data and Variables 
a. Data 
 
This research intends to understand the causal relationship 
between the capital structure in terms of financial leverage and 
MFIs performance: financial sustainability and outreach with 
additional control and firm characteristic variables. This study 
uses the unbalanced panel data from Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX⑦) Market covers 507 MFIs from 44 countries over 
the period of 2003 to 2015 in six regions such as Africa, East Asia 
and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. 
MIX Market is a non-profit-institution that intends to promote 
information exchange among the MFIs worldwide. Data from MIX 
Market is widely used and is considered as a reliable source of 
                                            
⑦ MIX Market could access through domain: http://www.themix.org/mixmarket. 
Some publications and performance indicators could freely access using MIX 
Discovery. To broadly get more data and information of each MFI, there are three 
more packages to subscribe based on the key data and indicators, accessibility, 





cross-country data containing both financial statements and 
outreach information of MFIs in US dollar using prevailing 
exchange rate. There are also many previous studies using the 
data of MIX Market so that the source of data is recognized as 
accountable (Ngoc N. B., 2016), (Quayes S., 2012) & (Vanroose A. 
& D'Espaller B., 2013). Furthermore, the country dataset of total 
population is exported from the website of World Bank.  
However, not all the data exporting from the MIX Market is 
used in this research. The sample only the country that has at 
least three MFIs and each MFI must have three consecutive years 
or more as the minimum requirement, has been chosen. The 
observations with below 0.5% and above 99.5% are removed 
because it is related to the outlier problem. Blank, abnormal data, 
and some years with small number of observations are also 
dropped. Initially, the total amount of data is 1606 MFIs of 108 
countries over the period of 1999 to 2016, but the observations 
are dropped if they do not qualify the minimum criteria. The data 
contains different characteristics and types of MFIs such as 
regulated and non-regulated MFIs, credit union/cooperative, bank, 
non-government organization (NGO), non-bank financial 










have to reach both social mission and self-sustainability called as 
the double-bottom line (Hartarska V. & Nadolnyak D., 2007). On 
one hand, MFIs need to reach out the underserved segmentation 
that live in the rural area and are not able to access to the formal 
institutions with their innovative market-based approach. On the 
other hand, MFIs need to operate by themselves without 
depending on subsidies or donations through income generation to 
cover the transaction cost. Therefore, the measurement of the 
performance of MFIs is quite different from other formal financial 
institutions with two important indicators. These measurements 
could provide some basic insights into the performance of MFIs in 
the minimum level to the outside investors (Rosenberg R., 2009). 
Financial Performance Measurement 
 
If MFIs intend to maintain and enlarge their operations in the long 
run, they need to earn enough returns to cover their operating 
costs (Rosenberg R., 2009). Thus, return on equity (ROE) is a 
common indicator widely used in financial institutions. ROE is the 
profitability or sustainability ratio measuring the ability of MFIs in 
generating incomes through the investment of owners (Rosenberg 
R., 2009). Its formula is net operating income minus taxes and 
divides by the average equity. Net operating income is calculated 
as the financial revenue minus the sum of financial expense, loan-
loss provision or impairment loss, and operating expense (MIX, 
2017). Average equity is the sum of total equity at the beginning 





equity is used because it gives an accurate description of the 
performance of MFIs during the fiscal year when there is any 
considerable change in equity value of shareholders (Harvey R. C., 
2012).  
This measure is suitable for institutions which do not get 
subsidies or donations. However, there are MFIs which obtain 
donations or subsidies in the form of grants or soft loans 
(concessionary loans) with an interest rate that is lower than the 
market rate. Therefore, it is important to measure the ability of 
MFIs operate by themselves. To identify it, there must be 
‘adjusted’ in financial report (Rosenberg R., 2009) & (Armendariz 
B., & Morduch J., 2010).  
The subsidy-adjusted measurement is operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) and it could be used to analyze financial 
sustainability of MFIs (BoganVicki, November 2012). It indicates 
the extent to which the financial revenues of MFIs cover their 
adjusted costs. OSS is calculated as the total financial revenue 
divides by the sum of financial expense, loan-loss provision or 
impairment loss, and operating expense (Armendariz B., & 
Morduch J., 2010). Financial revenues of MFIs mostly come from 
the interest rates and fees by loan clients; in contrast, a typical 
institution also receives revenues from investments and other 
financial services such as insurance, remittance, and other 
services (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010). Financial expense 
are the interest rates and fees that MFIs pay to shareholders, 





MFIs are allowed to take deposits by regulators) (Armendariz B., 
& Morduch J., 2010). Loan-loss provision or impairment loss is 
the amount of non-cash expense calculated as the expected 
percentage of the value of loan portfolio could not be recovered 
(Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010) & (MIX, 2017). The rate of 
loan-loss provision or impairment loss is calculated based on the 
loan classification and the number of overdue days in laws and 
regulations on financial institutions of each country. To take an 
example, loan classifications in Cambodia are categorized in four 
classes such as standard, substandard, doubtful, and loss (NBC, 
2002). Operating expenses are expenses on rent fees, 
depreciation and amortizations, personnel costs, administrative 
costs, and other operating costs. This ratio is presented as the 
percentage. MFIs with OSS more than 100 percent could operate 
by themselves without depending on additional subsides or 
donations (Armendariz B., & Morduch J., 2010) & (Rosenberg R., 
2009).  
Outreach Performance Measurement 
 
Besides reaching financial sustainability as one bottom line, MFIs 
also aim to meet social mission (outreach). Outreach is defined as 
reaching out to the poor clients and is calculated by the number of 
the poor borrowers being served at a given point in time 
(Rosenberg R., 2009). There are two important kinds of outreach 
indicators. The first measurement is the breadth of outreach 





one is the depth of outreach taking account of how the poor clients 
being served (Rosenberg R., 2009).  
The breadth of outreach is calculated as the number of active 
borrowers (NAB). It is more beneficial than the cumulative number 
of loan portfolio or clients reached during one period to reflect the 
actual service transaction of MFIs (Rosenberg R., 2009). The 
number of active borrowers is divided by number of population to 
normalize for the variation in population as data from many 
different countries.  
Another measurement is depth of outreach measurement of 
borrower poverty level. The depth of outreach is denoted by 
average loan balance per borrower (ALB): Gross loan portfolio 
divides by the number of active borrowers. This ratio also 
measures the loan size disbursed by MFIs. The smaller this ratio, 
the smaller loan size being served, the better depth of outreach 
MFIs has been reached (Quayes S., 2012). This indicator is often 
expressed as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per 
capita to compare MFIs from different countries with different 
national incomes (Rosenberg R., 2009).  
There is a debatable point on the advantages of both types of 
outreach. The depth of outreach is more beneficial to the non-
profit MFIs while MFIs consider more on the self-sustainability 
would rather access to the breadth of outreach (Rhyne E., 1998). 
However, some support the idea that reaching out the wide range 
of borrowers could be compensated for serving the poorest 





Thus, the dependent variables proxies as the MFIs 
performance measurement are financial performance 
measurement (return on equity (ROE) and operational self-
sufficiency (OSS)) and outreach performance measurement (the 
logarithm of the number of active borrowers/number of population 
(LNABP) and the logarithm of the average loan per 
borrower/gross national income per capita (LALBGNI)). 
Independent Variables 
 
The standard indicator of capital structure, lagged debt to equity 
(lagDTE) calculated as the total liabilities divided by total equity, 
is used as an explanatory variable which describes the extent to 
which MFIs depend on debt funding. Besides lagDTE ratio, there 
are also other lagged control variables and MFI specific variables 
that could influence the performance of MFIs.  
Gross loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA) ratio is a 
lending measurement of MFIs. This ratio also shows the ability of 
MFIs about borrower acknowledgement and lending administration. 
The higher ratio is, the higher risk exposure MFIs encounter. In 
contrast, the transaction costs of MFIs are high because MFIs use 
market-based approach; this ratio is supposed to be a positive 
relationship with financial performance (Abrar A. & Javaid Y A., 
2016), but it is uncertain with outreach performance.  
Non-performing loans (Portfolio at risk) with overdue 90 days 
(lagPAR90) is calculated as the total amount of loan portfolios 





is used to measure risk of MFIs. It indicates the loan collection 
ability and general management ability of MFIs. It is meant that 
the more number of delinquencies is, the more risk exposure is. 
LagPAR90 affects the profitability of MFIs so that it is expected 
to be negative relationship with financial performance (Abrar A. & 
Javaid Y A., 2016); however, it is unclear with outreach. 
More than 60 percentages of borrowers are female borrowers 
in sample of this observation as MFIs do not only aim to reduce 
poverty but also empower woman. Therefore, percentage of 
female borrowers (lagFB) would also control. In previous 
literature, it has been proven that the increase in woman 
borrowers positively affects the performance of MFIs because 
women make regular repayments and have less risk of default. 
Thus, this variable is expected to have positive correlation on the 
financial performance and outreach performance (Hermes N. & 
Lensink R., 2011) & (Quayes S., 2012).  
MFI Size (lagSIZE) is considered to affect the performance. 
Different sizes of MFIs have differences in opportunities of 
investment, market segmentation, technology, and product 
diversification. Big MFIs have low costs of operation based on the 
benefits of economics of scale and scope, debt financing 
accessibility, commercialization, more resources, and bigger 
market (Yang C. & Chen K., 2009). Regarding to the advantages 
of size, this variable is calculated as the logarithm of total assets 
and it is expected to have a positive effect on the financial 





negative relationship with outreach performance.  
Number of operating years of MFIs (lagAGE) could affect their 
performance because older MFIs have more learning experiences 
about their operations which could be more cost efficiency, have 
more knowledge about existing market so that the risk of default 
is lesser, have more financial and non-financial resources 
comparing to the start-up MFIs based on the concept of selection 
effects, learning by doing effects, and inertia effects (Kipesha F. 
E., 2013). LagAGE is expected to have positive relationship with 
financial performance and the breadth of outreach, but have 
negative relationship with the depth of outreach. 
Besides, this study also controls for other MFI specific 
characteristics variables as the dummy variables. There are three 
dummy variables in this research: regulated MFIs (Regulate), 
profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-taking institutions (DT). 
Regulated MFIs show the ability to get commercial sources, 
mobilize deposits from both loan and non-loan clients, and be 
subjective to the strict regulation and supervision framework to 
benefit to the poor. Regulate variable is expected to be positive 
correlation with the outreach performance, but it is unclear with 
financial performance (Abrar A. & Javaid Y A., 2016). Profit status 
of MFIs expresses the ability to create income and divides the 
profit to the relevant parties: owners, shareholders, personnel, 
and MFI themselves while non-profit MFIs consider more on 
outreach. As a result, MFIs with profit status are considered to 





better outreach (Quayes S., 2012). As deposit is one of MFI 
financing and MFIs with more deposit collection could reduce the 
cost of funding, deposit-taking institutions dummy variable is 
controlled. Deposit-taking MFIs are considered to have positive 
relationship with performances (see Table 5).  
IV. Empirical Models and Methodology 
 
The empirical model with all previous explained variables is used 
to measure financial sustainability and outreach of MFIs:  
 
Financial Performance Measurement 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡   =α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
lagSIZEit + β6lagAGEit + β7Regulateit + β8Profitit + β9DTit + μit (1)  
 
𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
lagSIZEit + β6lagAGEit + β7Regulateit + β8Profitit + β9DTit + μit (2) 
 
Outreach Performance Measurement 
 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡  = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it +
β
4
lagFBit + β5lagAGEit + β6Regulateit + β7Profitit + β8DTit + μit (3) 
 
𝐿𝐴𝐿𝐵𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it +
β
4
lagFBit + β5lagSIZEit + β6lagAGEit + β7Regulateit + β8Profitit +
β
9
DTit + μit  (4)  
The detail interpretations and the formulas of all the 





represents for constants; 𝛽 is a coefficient of variable; 𝑖 denotes 
individual MFIs; 𝑡 stands for time, and 𝜇 is the error term. The 
model 3, MFI size (lagSIZE) is deleted because it is involved with 
the multicollinearity problem based on the correlated matrix which 
would be described in the following section. The study runs 
descriptive statistics to deal with outlier problem and uses 
correlated matrix to tackle with multicollinearity issue. 
As this research uses unbalanced panel data containing 
different time periods and countries, the hypotheses testing 
related to the time-fixed effect and country-fixed effect is 
separately done with Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
test (Torres-Reyna O., 2007). The results illustrate that time and 
country are significant for this study; therefore, dummy variables 
of time and country are included when running the model. This 
study also uses lagged independent variables to see the causality 
between independent and dependent variables. 
Besides, this research uses both random effects and fixed 
effects panel data model⑧. Fixed effects model is used to cut down 
the effects of specific time invariant influences like managerial 
efficiency and other factors across MFIs that cause the different 
results. Whereas, the random effects model assumes there is no 
any omitted variable or there is no correlated between omitted 
variables and independent variables. If that is a case, random 
effects model would provide unbiased coefficients (Quayes S., 
                                            
⑧ The detailed explanation of random and fixed effects model could be found in 





2012). Additionally, dummy variables could only be captured by 
random effects model.  
V. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics summary of all 
dependent and independent variables from the period of 2003 to 
2015 with matched number of observations. The minimum value 
of OSS was 0.32 (32%) and the maximum 2.69 (269%) with mean 
value was 1.17 (117%). It means that the average number of MFIs 
could cover their expenses by financial revenues as MFIs are 
considered to reach their sustainability, operate by themselves 
without additional subsidies, if OSS is at least equal to 100% or 1. 
However, this outcome also shows there are some MFIs could not 
earn enough revenues to compensate their costs resulting in 
negative equity until they obtain subsidies or soft loans from 
outsiders. The mean value of ROE is 0.12 (12%) with high standard 
deviation, negative minimum value -3.67 (-367%), and maximum 
value 2.87 (287%) points to insufficient generating profit to cover 
costs. For number of active borrowers (NAB), average loan 
balance per borrower (ALB), and MFIs lending (GLPTA), the 
standard deviation is highly distributed within MFIs. The mean 
value of DTE is 4.95 (495%) which is greater than 100% or 1 
meaning that MFIs across 44 countries are leveraged. The table 
also presents there is numbers of microfinance institutions have 





The average rate of default (PAR90) is about 4% and around the 
average number of female borrowers (FB) is more than 60% which 
is meant that most of MFIs lend to female clients. The data 
contains different sizes of MFIs in total asset (LSIZE) and the 
average numbers of MFIs are matured as the average age of their 
operation is around 12 years (AGE).  
Table 7 is the correlation matrix summary. The results show 
the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables from 2003 to 
2015. The value that is close to 1 or -1 means both variables are 
highly correlated in the same or the inverse relationship. The 
highly related variables would not be used together in the model 
to avoid overlapped measurement. The bivariate relationship 
between LNABP and LSIZE is high. It could be explained that 
larger MFIs have more clients. Thus, model 3 would exclude 
LSIZE. The overall models of this study could be used without the 
problem of multicollinearity.  
a. Empirical Results 
Table 8 presents the results of two models – random effects 
model and fixed effects model- between the financial leverage and 
the financial performance measurement of MFIs. The first row 
illustrates that 1% increase in lagDTE results in around 0.01% 
increase in ROE for both random and fixed effects model, the 
estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1% level. The 
significant positive correlation between lagDTE and profitability 





(2016), Sckabiral (2013), Omare (2017), and Kyereboah-Colemn 
(2007). In contrast, lagDTE has negatively impact on OSS in 
random effects panel data model; it is positive in fixed effects 
panel model even if both of them are statistically insignificant. MFI 
lending (lagGLPTA) is highly and positively correlated with 
financial performance at the 0.1% significant level. It is meant that 
increasing 1% of lending could raise 0.29% of ROE in both models; 
the OSS in either model also shows increase. As expected, the 
higher risk exposure lowers profitability, gives less chance to 
cover the operating costs, and MFIs are unable to operate by 
themselves. LagFB is positive insignificant with both ROE and OSS 
for fixed effects and random effects model. MFI size (lagSIZE) and 
MFI age (lagAGE) show positive relationship with ROE and OSS 
although the impact is different in significant levels. It confirms 
the previous studies that larger firms and older firms are 
advantageous to resource management, cost management, and 
other above-mentioned benefits. Regulated MFIs, profit MFIs, and 
deposit-taking MFIs are insignificant correlation with either OSS 
or ROE for random effects model.  
Table 9 is the results of financial leverage and outreach 
performance measurement. LagDTE is significant positive 
relationship with the breadth of outreach (LNABP), although it is 
insignificant with the depth of outreach (LALBGNI) in both random 
effects and fixed effects panel data model. Thus, 1% increases in 
financial leverage results in about 0.01% increase in the breadth 





coefficient respectively. The empirical results are consistent with 
the previous literatures conducted by Kyereboah-Colemn (2007). 
lagGLPTA affects positively and significantly on the breadth of 
outreach while it is insignificant inverse relationship with the 
depth of outreach in both random effects and fixed effects model. 
LagPAR90 impacts negatively on both outreach indicators. It 
points that MFIs with the higher rate of default would find the 
difficulties to serve more clients as it causes low earning revenues. 
The higher percentage of female borrowers (lagFB) is the more 
clients MFIs reach since it has statically significant positive 
relationship with the breadth of outreach. As the previous studies 
found, MFIs intend to empower women and women have better 
repayment rate. Unexpectedly, it has an inverse correlation with 
the depth of outreach in 0.1% and 1% significant level for both 
models. These findings could be explained that MFIs are less 
efficient when lending to female clients (Hermes N., Lensink R. & 
Meesters A., 2011). MFI size (lagSIZE) has significant positive 
related with the depth of outreach. It could be interpreted that the 
bigger MFIs is, the richer in resources to serve the poorest are. 
MFI age (lagAGE) has significant positive correlation with the 
breadth of outreach, but it has negative relationship with the depth 
of outreach. The negative effect is because the poorest could 
benefit from lending regardless of the age of the MFIs. Regulated 
MFIs, profit MFIs, and deposit-taking MFIs have positive impact 
on the outreach performance to some extent. As a result, MFIs 





due to the restrict supervision from the regulators. 
b. Empirical Results of MFIs with Different Legal Status 
 
With diverse legal status of MFIs in dataset, this study would do 
further analysis by separately running the random effects model. 
By doing so, it would provide the clearer picture of the impact of 
capital structure on the performance of different types of MFIs:  
Non-government organization (NGO), Non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI), Bank, Credit union/ Cooperative (CU/COO), 
and Rural bank (RB). These MFIs are different to legal framework, 
products, services, and above-mentioned points.  
Table 10 shows the causal relationship between financial 
leverage and ROE of MFIs with different legal status. LagDTE of 
NGO and NBFI are highly significant positive relationships with 
ROE at 0.1% significant level of the estimated coefficient. Rising 
1% in lagDTE cause 0.01% and 0.02% upturns in ROE of NGO and 
NBFI. It could be caused by the available lower-cost funding 
sources and the high amount of lending that MFIs could earn 
premium while others are insignificant. ROE of all types of MFIs 
are negatively affected by lagPAR90 with significant level except 
for bank. Again, the higher default rate is, the lower earning 
income of MFIs is. MFI age (lagAGE) of bank is positive and 
significant, so it could be concluded that the older bank is, the 
higher profit they could obtain as it could take advantage of the 
reasonable interest rate of commercial loan. Profit CU/COO and 





5% significant level, while the others are insignificant. The 
percentage of female borrowers (lagFB), MFI size, regulated MFIs, 
and deposit-taking MFIs are insignificant across MFIs meaning 
that the ROE performance is not influenced by these variables.  
Table 11 illustrates the impact of lagDTE on operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) of MFIs with different legal status. The outcome 
shows the financial leverage negatively affects the OSS of bank 
although the others have negative insignificant correlations 
excluding credit union/cooperative (CU/COO). CU/COO may 
access lower cost of funding sources from their members. 
Whereas, bank is significantly affected by the debt financing at 1% 
significant level because banks are regulated institutions which 
are under the strict laws and regulations. Moreover, they tend to 
depend on more debt financing than donations or subsidies (Boga 
V., 2009). As a result, they might not generate enough income to 
cover the interest rate repayment of debts as well as it is costly 
to comply with legal requirements. MFI lending (lagGLPTA) is 
positive correlation across many MFIs, but only NGO and NBFI 
are significantly positive with OSS. LagPAR90 is negative 
relationship with OSS; only NGO and CU/COO are significant. Only 
bank is statically affected by the lagFB at 1% significant level. The 
outcomes confirm larger and older MFIs gain more advantages 
comparing to the smaller ones. Regulated MFIs, profit MFIs, and 
deposit-taking MFIs are insignificant with OSS.  
Table 12 presents the financial leverage and the breadth of 





statues. NGO, NBFI, and bank are positively and significantly 
affected by lagDTE at the 5% significant level of the estimated 
coefficient. 1% increases in lagDTE raises 0.005%, 0.007%, and 
0.008% of LNABP of NGO, NBFI, and bank respectively. But, 
CU/COO and RB are insignificant. MFI lending (lagGLPTA) has 
significant positive correlation with the breadth of outreach of 
NBFI, bank, and RB while others are positive insignificant. The 
default rate (lagPAR90) affects negatively on the LNABP of all 
kind of MFIs, but not significant excluding bank (at 0.1% significant 
level) and CU/COO (at 5% significant level). There is the positive 
and significant impact of lagFB and the breadth of outreach for 
MFIs except for CU/COO as it is the member-based financial 
institution. MFI age (lagAGE) positively influences the LNABP of 
majority of MFIs. However, RB is affected in the inverse 
relationship and Bank is insignificant. Besides, regulated MFIs, 
profit MFIs, and deposit-taking MFIs are insignificant correlations 
with LNABP for all MFIs excluding profit RB which is significantly 
positive with LNABP at 1% significant level. 
Table 13 notes the effect of financial structure on the depth 
of outreach (LALBGNI) of MFIs with different legal status. The 
financial leverage is positive and significant correlation with the 
depth of outreach of RB at the 1% significant level while the others 
are insignificant. All types of MFIs have negative relationship with 
lagFB; especially, NGO, NBFI, and bank at 0.1% significant level. 
Meanwhile, CU/COO and RB are affected by lagFB at 5% 





to female clients. The outcomes of lagGLPTA, lagPAR90, 
regulated MFIs, profit MFIs and deposit-taking MFIs are mixed, 
but they are mostly insignificant related with LALBGNI. All MFI 
size (lagSIZE) is positive correlated with LALBGNI; in particular, 
NGO, NBFI, bank, and CU/COO at 0.1% significant level. 
Contrasting with MFI size, MFI age (lagAGE) has negative 
correlation with LALBGNI of NBFI except for RB which is positive 
and significant.  
c. Discussion  
The crucial outcome based on the empirical study is the essential 
role of capital structure in terms of financial leverage on the 
performance of MFIs: profitability (ROE) and the breadth of 
outreach (LNABP) as shown in Table 8 and Table 9. Accordingly, 
the impact of capital structure is insignificant with operational 
self-sufficient (OSS) and the depth of outreach (LALBGNI). The 
positive and significant effects of capital structure come from the 
advantages of debt financing like tax shield which confirm the 
trade-off theory and are consistent with the previous studies done 
by Abar and Javaid (2016), Sckabiral (2013), Omare (2017), and 
Kyereboah-Colemn (2007). The advantages of debt help MFIs to 
generate income and pay their transaction costs such as financial 
expense, loan loss provision, and operating expense. When MFIs 
could earn sufficient financial revenue to cover their cost, they 
are able to operate by themselves without heavily depending on 





Once MFIs serve more customers, they could obtain more interest 
rates and fees as their incomes. However, the result of OSS is 
negative insignificant correlation with debt. It may come from 
some MFIs could not generate enough profit to cover their 
expenditures. Moreover, the higher amount of debt does not 
always bring out the benefits. When it reaches to the certain level, 
the costs of debt would outweigh the advantage ones so that there 
is an optimal leverage (see Figure 4). 
Based on the trade-off theory stated that the optimal point of 
debt is when the marginal return of debt is equal to the marginal 
cost of debt (Berk J., DeMarzo P. & Harford J., 2012). It meant 
that firms could benefit from borrowings when the present value 
(PV) of tax shield coming from interest rate is greater than the 
financial distress created by direct costs of bankruptcy and 
indirect costs of financial distress. If the firm goes on borrowings 
at the point beyond the optimal level, firm would fall into the risk 
of bankruptcy. This theory is also applicable to MFIs even if MFIs 
have double bottom line. As a consequence, it is very important to 
consider the sources of financing – whether financing through 
debt or equity– to create the best mix of capital structure within 
own firm and the different usages of leverage are different across 
industries as elucidated by the theory.  
Additional to the trade-off theory, the high level of debt could 
put pressure on managers of MFIs to take appropriate actions to 
prevent the risk of default caused by financial distress depended 





and makes MFIs earn more profit, be self-sustainable, and serve 
more customers. The reduction of agency cost was confirmed by 
Skoplijak (2012) and Kyereboah-Colemn (2007) papers. 
Besides studying the impact of capital structure as a whole, 
this research also aims to specifically investigate how MFIs with 
different legal status are affected by debt financing. The results 
are mixed as the majority of MFI types have insignificant impacts 
in the same direction and some are affected by the financial 
leverage in various significant levels. The findings could be 
explained that the business model and goals are greatly similar 
across MFIs with different legal status (Ngo (2016), Hartarska 
(2005), and Mersland and Strom (2008)), the stable funding costs 
across MFIs (CGAP & Symbiotics' MIVs Surveys, 2016), and the 
majority of shareholders in MFIs are public funders (Kohn (2013), 
MicroRate (2013), and Earne and Sherk (2013)) so that most of 
the MFIs affect in the same direction of correlation.  
VI. Recommendations and Limitations  
a. Recommendations 
 
Based on these empirical results, managers, funders, investors, 
and governments should fully comprehend both costs and benefits 
of debt financing as it is two-fold financial instrument before 
setting appropriate strategies, laws, and regulations to make the 
financial inclusion. Equally important, cheaper cost of funding 





into consideration since they help MFIs to boost efficiency through 
effective management, to generate more income, to cut down cost, 
and to broadly serve the underserved segmentations.  
 
b. Limitations  
 
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, it is related to 
the data source. Even if the MIX Market contained many MFIs from 
different countries, all of the worldwide MFIs are not obligated to 
report their financial statements or financial information to this 
organization. As a consequence, the number of MFIs is constrained 
which may have affected the results as a selection bias. Secondly, 
some important variables such as types of funders, types of 
products and services, lending methodologies, and others could 
not be obtained to be put in the model and analysis as the control 
variables that led to the endogeneity problem, the issue when the 
independent variables are correlated with the unobservable 
variables or error term, could have contributed to the biased 
results. By the same token, the research does not take into 
account the reverse causality that performance drives the capital 
structure of MFIs rather than capital structure drives the 
performance (Skopljak V., 2012). Moreover, this study does not 
include a robustness check as there is no big change of the results. 
The last but not least, the period of this study covers the period 
from 2003 to 2015, including the period of global financial crisis. 








Capital structure is a topic of debate within corporate finance. 
There are two competing theories that describe the behavior of 
financing decision across firms with existing empirical studies. In 
contrast, the study of this problem is quite limited within 
microfinance industry because the previous studies have mainly 
focus on one region or one economy and the numbers of studies 
have excluded the other firm characteristics that could affect the 
performance of MFIs. Therefore, this study was intended to fulfill 
the gap to the existing literatures. According to the main empirical 
results, the profitability and the breadth of outreach of MFIs are 
positively and significantly affected by the financial leverage. The 
pros of debt financing assist MFIs to increase financial revenues, 
to cover their operation costs, to be independent of subsidies, and 
to reach out the poor and the poorest (Abar and Javaid (2016), 
Sckabiral (2013), Omare (2017), and Kyereboah-Colemn (2007)). 
As there are different types of MFIs regarding of their legal status, 
this research separately ran the random effects model to see how 
financial leverage individually influences the performance of MFIs. 
The finding is that debt financing has insignificant correlation with 
most types of MFIs and few MFIs are slightly affected in the same 
direction. The similarity of organizational models and objectives, 





MFIs could have contributed to the outcomes (Ngo (2016), 
Hartarska (2005), and Mersland and Strom (2008), (CGAP & 
Symbiotics' MIVs Surveys, 2016), Kohn (2013), (Earne J. & Sherk 
L., 2013), and MicroRate (2013)). As a consequence, all the 
relevant practitioners or parties should be fully aware of the side 
effect of debt financing to make financial inclusion; more 
importantly, cost efficiency should be considered through other 
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Figure 1 Development of Main Microfinance Markets 
 
This figure shows the development and trends of main microfinance markets by 
region in 2016. Global microfinance market was supposed to grow from 10-15% 
in 2016. Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia Pacific were expected to have the 




Central Asia and Caucasus 0-10% 
Latin America 5-10% 
Eastern Europe 10% 
Middle East and North Africa 10-15% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 15-20% 
Asia Pacific Around 30% 
 





Figure 2 Percentages of Active Borrowers and Product Offering 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of number of active borrowers and product 
offering by the MFIs via MIVs from 2008 to 2015. The number of voluntary 
savings is an upward trend so that it is expected to proceed with regulatory 
mechanisms from regulators.   
 







Table 1 Characteristic of MFIs 
 
Table 1 presents the distinctive unique characteristics of MFIs with different 
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Figure 3 Determinants of Interest Rates 
 
Figure 3 is the comparison of operation costs in lending between the developed 
countries and the developing countries based on the data from Germany. 
Operating costs account for 63% of total amount of interest rate in developing 
economies; whereas, it is less than 30% in developed economies.  
 
 






Table 2 Financial Structure of MFIs 
 
Table 2 illustrates the funding sources of MFIs. MFIs could raise capital in the 
form of debt or equity or both from private funders and public funders. Debt 
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Table 3 Public Funders and Private Funders 
 
Table 3 gives the detail information of public funders and private funders of MFIs. 
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Agencia Española de 
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Belgian Investment 
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Corporación Andina de 
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Development Agency 
(FMO), European Bank 







Corporation (IFC), KfW 
Entwicklungsbank (KfW), 
Multilateral Investment 
Fund (MIF IADB) 
Tools 
Used 
Grants, guarantees Grants, 
guarantees, debt, 
equity 























































Figure 4 Funding Sources of MFIs 
 
Figure 4 shows the funding sources of MFIs from public funders and private 




















Table 4 Ownership and Funding Sources of MFIs 
 





Type of MFIs Ownership Funding 
NGOs 
No owners, strong 
ownership characteristics 
among founders and board 
Grants and debt from 
development institutions, 
foundations, socially responsible 




Mix of public and private 
shareholders; sometimes 
other financial institutions 
or other companies 
Mix of equity and debt financing 





Equity and debt financing, usually 
from public sources and savings 
Credit Unions/ 
Cooperatives 
Owned by members Equity provided from member 
contributions; deposits and some 
external debt 
MFI Banks  
Mostly private 
shareholders; some 
development banks as 
initial shareholders 
Mix of equity and debt financing 
from both private and public 
sources, deposits 
Source: (Ledgerwood J. , Institutional Providers, 2013) 
45%














Table 5 Dependent and Independent Variables Summary 
 
Table 5 provides the abbreviations, formulas, and expected results of outcome 
variables and explanatory variables. Return on equity (ROE) and operational self-
sufficient (OSS) proxy for financial performance measurement of MFIs; whereas, 
the breadth of outreach divided by number of population (LNABP) and the depth 
of outreach normalized by gross national income per capita (LALBGNI) stand for 






Variable  Abbreviation  Formula Expected 
Result 
Fin. Out. 




Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
(Net Operating Income - 
Taxes)/ (Average Equity) 




(Financial Expense + 
Loan-Loss Provision or 
Impairment Loss+ 
Operating Expense) 







Logarithm of Number of 
Active Borrowers/ Number 
of Population 
    
Depth of Outreach 
(LALBGNI) 
Logarithm of Average 
Loan Balance per 
Borrower/Gross National 
Income Per Capita 
    
Independent Variable     
Financial Leverage Debt to Equity 
(DTE) 
Liabilities/Equity     
Loan GLPTA Gross Loan Portfolio/ 
Total Assets 
+ +/- 
Risk Portfolio at risk 
90 days (PAR90) 
Portfolio at Risk > 90 
days/Gross Loan Portfolio 
- +/- 
Gender Empowerment Percentage of 
Female 
Borrowers (FB) 
Number of Active Woman 
Borrowers/ Number of 
Active Borrowers 
+ + 
MFI Size LSIZE Logarithm of Total Assets + +/- 
MFI Age LAGE Logarithm of Number of 
Operating Years  
+ +/- 
Regulated MFIs Regulate Dummy +/- + 
Profit MFIs Profit Dummy + +/- 





Table 6 Descriptive Statistics Summary 
 
Table 6 is the descriptive statistics summary of dependent variables and 
independent variables. OSS, ROE, NAB, ALB are dependent variables being 
representative for operational self-sufficient, return on equity, number of active 
borrower, and average loan per borrower respectively. DTE, GLPTA, PAR90, FB, 
LSIZE, AGE are explanatory variables denoted as debt to equity, gross loan 
portfolio to total asset, non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) past due for more 




Variable Obs   Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
OSS 2,994 1.1691 0.2562 0.3226 2.6923 
ROE 2,994 0.1165 0.2831 -3.6744 2.8659 
NAB 2,994 116965.6 514771.3 84 6710000 
ALB 2,994 1364.064 3074.075 14.98 64087.21 
DTE 2,994 4.9543 4.3501 -14.6112 39.1410 
GLPTA 2,994 0.7553 0.1741 0.1185 5.7026 
PAR90 2,994 0.0395 0.0572 0 0.7602 
FB 2,994 0.6593 0.2574 0 1 
LSIZE 2,994 7.1969 0.7851 4.8171 9.3075 











Table 7 Correlation Matrix Summary 
 
Table 7 is the correlation matrix summary of dependent variables and 
independent variables. OSS, ROE, LNABP and LALBGNI are operational self-
sufficient, return on equity, the logarithm of number of active borrower/number 
of population, and the logarithm of average loan per borrower/gross national 
income per capita respectively. DTE, GLPTA, PAR90, FB, LSIZE and LAGE are 
debt to equity, gross loan portfolio to total asset, non-performing loans (portfolio 
at risk) past due for more than 90 days, percentage of female borrowers, MFI 
size, and MFI age respectively. 
 
 
 OSS ROE LNABP LALBGNI DTE GLPTA PAR90 FB LSIZE LAGE 
OSS 1          
ROE 0.53 1         
LNABP 0.09 0.06 1        
LALBGNI 0.03 -0.01 0.21 1       
DTE -0.11 0.07 0.07 0.12 1      
GLPTA 0.17 0.12 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 1     
PAR90 -0.18 -0.15 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.07 1    
FB 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.56 0.02 0.12 -0.08 1   
LSIZE 0.12 0.11 0.73 0.33 0.22 0.002 0.04 -0.24 1  






Table 8 Financial Performance Measurement 
 
Table 8 shows the empirical results of the causal relationship between the 
financial leverage and the financial performance measurement. Dependent 
variables are return on equity (ROE) and operational self-sufficiency (OSS), 
respectively. Lagged independent variables are debt to equity (lagDTE), gross 
loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) 
past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage of female borrowers 
(lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and three dummy variables: 
regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-taking MFIs (DT). 
RE is random effects model and FE is fixed effects model.  
 
Regime 1: 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
lagSIZEit + β6lagAGEit + β7Regulateit + β8Profitit + β9DTit + μit  
 
Regime 2:  𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
lagSIZEit + β6lagAGEit + β7Regulateit + β8Profitit + β9DTit + μit 
 
 
                   
ROE(RE) 
   (1) 
 ROE(FE) 
    (1) 
OSS(RE) 
   (2)  
OSS(FE) 
   (2) 













(7.62)    
0.303*** 
(7.30)  


























































Observations                                          2487 2487 2487 2487 






Table 9 Outreach Performance Measurement 
 
Table 9 demonstrates the empirical results of the causal relationship between 
the financial leverage and the outreach performance measurement. Dependent 
variables are the logarithm of number of active borrowers/number of population 
(LNABP) and the logarithm of average loan per borrower/gross national income 
per capita (LALBGNI), respectively. Lagged independent variables are debt to 
equity (lagDTE), gross loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing 
loans (portfolio at risk) past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage 
of female borrowers (lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and three 
dummy variables: regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-
taking MFIs (DT). RE is random effects model and FE is fixed effects model.  
 
Regime 3:  𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
lagAGEit + β6Regulateit + β7Profitit + β8DTit + μit 
 
Regime 4:  𝐿𝐴𝐿𝐵𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5




    (3) 
LNABP(FE) 
    (3) 
LALBGNI(RE) 
     (4)  
LALBGNI(FE) 
     (4) 





















(-1.81)   
-0.211** 
(-2.70) 





(-8.18)   
-0.0774** 
(-2.63) 
lagSIZE                             . .  0.168*** 
(12.34) 
0.142*** 
(8.03)      













                





                





                








Observations                              2487 2487 2487 2487 







Table 10 Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
Table 10 demonstrates the empirical results of the causal relationship between 
the financial leverage and the financial performance measurement of MFIs with 
different legal status using random effects model. Dependent variable is return 
on equity (ROE). Lagged independent variables are debt to equity (lagDTE), gross 
loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) 
past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage of female borrowers 
(lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and three dummy variables: 
regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-taking MFIs (DT). 
NGO is non-government organization, NBFI is non-bank financial institution, 
CU/COO is credit union/cooperative, and RB is rural bank. 
 
Regime 1: 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5










  (1) 
RB 
(1)    









(-0.66)   

























































                 








0.243*   
(2.53) 







                 









(-0.46)    
Observations                 698 698 412 524 137 









Table 11 Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) 
 
Table 11 presents the empirical results of the causal relationship between the 
financial leverage and the financial performance measurement of MFIs with 
different legal status using random effects model. Dependent variable is 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS). Lagged independent variables are debt to 
equity (lagDTE), gross loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing 
loans (portfolio at risk) past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage 
of female borrowers (lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and three 
dummy variables: regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-
taking MFIs (DT). NGO is non-government organization, NBFI is non-bank 
financial institution, CU/COO is credit union/cooperative, and RB is rural bank. 
 
Regime 2:  𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5









  (2) 
RB 
(2)    

































































































Observations                 698 698 412 524 137 







Table 12 Breadth of Outreach (LNABP) 
 
Table 12 shows the empirical results of the causal relationship between the 
financial leverage and the outreach performance measurement of MFIs with 
different legal status using random effects model. Dependent variable is the 
logarithm of number of active borrowers/number of population (LNABP). Lagged 
independent variables are debt to equity (lagDTE), gross loan portfolio to total 
assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) past due for more 
than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage of female borrowers (lagFB), MFI age 
(lagAGE), and three dummy variables: regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs 
(Profit), and deposit-taking MFIs (DT). NGO is non-government organization, 
NBFI is non-bank financial institution, CU/COO is credit union/cooperative, and 
RB is rural bank. 
 
Regime 3:  𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5










  (3) 
RB 
(3)    



















(2.54)   





























(-2.07)    







                

















                










Observations                 698 698 412 524 137 









Table 13 Depth of Outreach (LALBGNI) 
 
Table 13 illustrates the empirical results of the causal relationship between the 
financial leverage and the outreach performance measurement of MFIs with 
different legal status using random effects model. Dependent variable is the 
logarithm of average loan per borrower/gross national income per capita 
(LALBGNI). Lagged independent variables are debt to equity (lagDTE), gross 
loan portfolio to total assets (lagGLPTA), non-performing loans (portfolio at risk) 
past due for more than 90 days (lagPAR90), percentage of female borrowers 
(lagFB), MFI size (lagSIZE), MFI age (lagAGE), and three dummy variables: 
regulated MFIs (Regulate), profit MFIs (Profit), and deposit-taking MFIs (DT). 
NGO is non-government organization, NBFI is non-bank financial institution, 
CU/COO is credit union/cooperative, and RB is rural bank. 
 
Regime 4:  𝐿𝐴𝐿𝐵𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = α0 + β1lagDTEit + β2lagGLPTAit + β3lagPAR90it + β4lagFBit +
β
5
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RB  
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(-2.06)     



























                

















                










Observations                  698 698 412 524 137 








Table 14 Optimal Leverage of Firm 
 
Table 14 demonstrates the optimal leverage level of firm based on the trade-off 
theory. The marginal cost of leverage would be increased over the marginal 
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경영학과 재무금융 전공 
Ly Sophy 
 
 자본 구조와 성과의 기존 연구들은 자본 구조 이론을 
바탕으로 이익추구형 기업이나 금융기관을 포함한 다양한 기업들이 
어떻게 자본 조달 결정을 할 것인가에 대해 다뤘다. 그러나, 
미소금융 기관을 주제로 한 자본 구조 연구는 상당히 제한적인데 그 
이유는 미소금융이 특정 지역이나 국가에서 이뤄지고 이전 연구에서 
미소금융기관의 독특한 특성을 포함하지 못했기 때문이다. 
미소금융기관은 개발도상국의 빈곤 완화가 주 목적이기 때문에 다른 
전통적인 금융기관들과는 달리 자급력과 원조활동이 주요 
관심사이다. 본 논문은 몇 가지 목적에 따라 진행되었다.  
 
우선, 본 논문은 독자들에게 미소금융기관에 대해 짧게 
개략적 설명을 하고자 한다. 다음, 2003년부터 2015년 까지 
44개국에 있는 507개의 미소금융 기관의 성과와 lagged 
부채자본비율(lagDTE)로 나타낸 자본 구조와의 인과관계를 
밝히고자 한다. 다른 금융 기관들과 다르게, 미소 금융 기관의 
성과는 재무적 성과나 원조활동 성과로 측정되는데 본 연구에서는 
재무성과의 지표로써 자기자본 이익률(ROE)과 운영 자급률(OSS)을 
살펴보고, 원조활동 성과의 지표로써 원조 활동의 폭을 인구수로 
나눈 로그값 (LNABP)과 원조 활동의 심도를 1인당 국민 
총소득으로 나눈 로그값(LALBGNI)를 사용한다. 주요 설명 변수는 
lagDTE이고, 다른 lagged 통제 변수로는 총자산대비 총대출자산 
(lagGLPTA), 90일 만기가 지난 부실여신 (lagPAR90), 여성 고객 
비율 (lagFB), 미소금융기관 규모 (lagSIZE), 미소금융기관 나이 
(lagAGE), 그리고 세 개의 더미 변수, 이익추구형 미소금융기관 
(Profit), 미소금융기관 규제 (Regulate), 그리고 예금상품을 






랜덤 효과와 고정 효과 패널 자료 모형을 통해 실증적으로 
분석한 결과 기존 문헌들의 결과와 일관되게 차입에 의한 절세 
효과로 재무 레버리지가 수익성(ROE)과 원조활동의 폭 (LNABP)에 
유의미하게 긍정적인 영향을 미친다는 것을 확인 할 수 있었고, 
이것은 미소금융기관도 기업 재무의 trade-off theory를 따른 다는 
것을 보여준다. 반대로, lagged 부채자본비율 (lagDTE)은 운영 
자급률 (OSS)와 원조 활동의 심도 (LALBGNI)에 유의하게 영향을 
미치지 않는 것으로 나왔다. 재무 레버리지와 운영 자급률 (OSS)의 
유의하지 않은 관계는 운영 비용을 보상하는 데 필요한 충분한 
수익을 내지 못하는 많은 미소금융기관 때문일 수도 있다. 더 
나아가, 다른 법적 지위와 관련하여 미소금융기관의 성과에 대한 
재무 레버리지의 효과는 대부분 유의하지 않았다. 그 주요한 이유로 
대다수의 주주들이 공공 기금인 것을 감안할 때 미소금융기관이 
동일한 조직 모형과 목적을 설정하고 있기 때문일 것이다. 또한, 
미소금융기관은 미소금융 투자 기구를 통해 공적, 민간 
자본으로부터 투자 지원을 안정적으로 받을 수 있을지도 모른다.  
 
마지막 제안으로는, 각 관련된 분야에서 그러므로 세부 전략, 
법, 그리고 규제를 세우기 전에 Trade-off theory에 따라 비용 대비 
부채의 사용이 추가적인 이익을 낼 수도 있고 혹은 재무적 
불안정성을 야기할 수도 있으므로 재무적 의사결정을 고려해야 한다. 
추가로, 비용 절감과 지속 가능 개발을 할 수 있도록 대체 자금 
원천인 예금을 확충하고 혁신적인 기술의 발전시켜야 한다. 
 
 주요어: 자본 구조, 재무 레버리지, 운영 자급률 (OSS), 자기자본 
이익률 (ROE), 원조활동의 폭 (NAB), 원조활동의 심도 (ALB) 
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